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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
R~~'rTY .A~K H.EN,

.Applicant and Appellant,
y:-;.

Cas·e No.

I ~DF~TRL.\ L CO~l~rTSSION OF

FT.\H.
AT£0~

9969

~PI·:BHY

RA};D CORPORand LIBERTY :MUTUAL

I~sFIL\XCE CO~IPANY,

Defrndants and Respondents.

DEFEXDANTS' BRIEF
X.\TFRE OF THE C.&SE
Thi~ i~

an appeal from a denial of injury benefits
undt>r the 'Vorkmen's Compensation Act.
DlsPOsTTTOX IX

IXD1~RTRIAL CO~LJliSSION

.After ~1 hearing-, the Industrial Commission concluded applicant's proof failed to establish that her
injurit'~ aro~r out of or in the course of her employment
and after her application for rehearing was denied, this
ap})e'al followed.
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STATEMENT O:B.., F AOTS
Applicant was an employee of Sperry Utah Engineering Laboratory, a division of defendant Sperry Rand,
at its plant located on the Clearfield Naval Base. In the
plant building where applicant worked was a cafeteria
operated for Sperry bry Clark, Inc., an independent contractor engaged in the business of supplying food and
operating food services in manufacturing plants (R. 68).
On the day of her injury, applicant had purchased
and eaten her lunch in the cafeteria and was taking her
tray to the dish washing area, as was the custom, when
she fell on the floor, sustaining injuries for which she
sought compensation (R. 19).
At the hearing before the Industrial Commission,
it was shown that employees of the plant were not rflquired to eat at the cafeteria and only about 35 per cent
of them did. Others ate at the Navy Cafeteria on the
naval base, or at public restaurants, while many brought
lunches from home or went hom·e to lunch (R. 28).
During the lunch period, employees were on their
own time and were not paid for that time. Plant rules
required them to "check in" to the work area at the beginning of the shift and to "check out" four hours later
foT lunch. After lunch, they again checked in and finally
checked out at the end of the day. This ''check in and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3
('h('ek out ~y:·dPm" was not in eff·ect during the lunch period and tho~P who enten·d or h--ft the building in that
pt>riotl did so without control h!· SpPrry (R. 31, 32).
~~ollowin~ the ( ommi:-;sion hearing, .a copy of the
1

agreement lwtwE'Pn SpE'IT). and Clark waH furnished to
the Commission at the n·qtwst of the Referee (R. 67).
By tlw tt•rm~ of this agreement, the entire control, management and supervision of the cafeteria area and faeilitiP~ was surn•JHlPrPd to Clark to run as it chose, the
only eX('Pption being the "food :-;ervice dining area floors,
walls, cPilings and window:-;,'' as to which the "respon~ihility for elPaning, waxing and mopping" remained
with ~\H'ITY (R. 70-71 ). The responsibility for all other
art>a~. facilitit·~, services and ·operations was .assumed

by Clark. Even the cleaning responsibility for the "dining room tables and chairs" was given to Clark (R. 71).
FndPr the agreement it was provided that "the prices
<•harged by Clark, Inc., for foods and other products
~hall

be reasonable" ( R. 73) and the "price of me·rrhaJHli~~' dispensed from the vending machines must be
the reasonable and fair market price charged by comparable competitor~ within this area" (R. 69).
sold

Based upon the foregoing evidence, the Commission
found tl1at "The cafeteria was operated hy Clark, Inc.
on

prPmi~E':'

owned by Sperry Rand Corporation under
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a contractual arrangement which in our opinion does not
indicate that Sperry exercised direction or control over
employees while on their lunch hour" (R. 40).
Applicant's claim for compensation was denied as
was also her Amended Application for Rehearing (R.
78-80) and applicant then filed her Petition for Writ of
Review in this Court (R. 81-83).
ARGUMENT
THE FINDING BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
THAT APPLICANT'S INJURIES WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY RELATED TO AND, HENCE, DID NOT ARISE
OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HER EMPLOYMENT IS
AMPLY SUPPORTED IN THE RECORD AND THE DENIAL
OF HER CLAIM WAS NOT ERROR.

This Court in a long line of cases has established
and repeatedly affirmed the standard by which it must
be guided in cases where an applicant appeals from a
denial by the Industrial Commission of his claim to
workmen's compensation benefits. Thus, as it stated in
Jones v. California Packing Corp. (Vtah 1952), 2++ P. 2d
640 at 642, quoting from T¥ oodburn v. Industrial Commwsion (Utah 1947), 181 P. 2d. 209:
"The extent of review by this court in this
t~cpe of cas·e is : Did the Commission act without

or in excess of its powers in denying compensation
to the plaintiff~ * * *
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"In the ra:-;C' of denial of compensation, the
re•·ord mu:-;t di:-;<'losP that there is material, subHtant in\, rompetent, uncontradicted evidence· suffieiPnt to make a disregard of it justify the
t•otwln:-;ion, as a mattPr of law, that the Industrial
( \Hnmi:-;:-;ion arbitrarily and capriciously disreg-anh·<l the evidence or unrPasonahl:' refused to
hf liPvP :-;neh evidence."
11

Thi:-; stnndanl for review was again reiterated h:'
this 'Court in thP n'<'Pnt case of I~a 11:; v. TV estern States
Ut•fiuing Co. (Ftah 1963), :~~-1- P. 2d 101;), in different
term:', n~ follow:-;:
", .. our ~tatnh•, Section 35-1-85, U.C.A. 1953,
g-rant~ the Commission the prerogative of finding
tlw fad~. "\Vhen it has denied the application for
rompensation and a reversal is sought, the applirant, as the moving party, has the burden of
showing that the evidence is such that a finding
in her favor is the only reasonable finding that
could be made, so that the Commission's refusal
to ~o find was capricious and arbitrary." (Empha~i~ supplied.)
\Yhen measured against this standard, it becomes
()h\·ion:' that appPllant, in this appeal from the denial of
rompen:'ation, both misconceives the burden which the
law c~l:'t~ upon her as the appellant and misunderstands
the real meaning of the ntunerous cases and other authoritit'~ which she rites in support of her position.
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Appellant assum'es from the fact that the Commission could have found for her under the evidence, which
respondents concede, that it was error for it not to have
done so. However, before appellant can prevail on this
appeal, she must sustain her burden as outlined above
and show that from the evidence the only reasonable
finding that could be made would be in her favor and that
the Commission capriciously and arbitrarily refused to
so find.
As is apparent from the record, this is clearly not
such a case. Rather, there is ample competent, substantial
and credible evidence in the record which shows an absence of control over applicant by Sperry and an absencf'
of control over the premises in which she was at the
time of her accident. :l\Ioreover, the record shows that
the relationship between applicant's injury and her employment \Yas extremely tenuous at best.
Although the cafeteria was located within the building in which Sperry's Clearfield Plant was located, it
was operated, managed and controlled by Clark, Inc.,
a business entity which was and is completPly independent of and unrelated to Sperry, except through its
eontract with Sperry. Clark, Inc., hired its o~wn employees, prepared its own menus and, except for "cle.aning, waxing and mopping" of the dining room area
which was left to Sperry, it exercised a complete supervision and control over the ·entire space comprising the
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cafetPrin. Similarly, the priers charged by Clark, Inc.
for its pro<ln<"ts and sprviees were determined by it,
within thl' sindr limitation that the prices had to be
rt:ast>nahle and in linP with those charged by "comparable
compt·t itors" within the immediate area (R. 69). The
~·om parable t'()ttq wt it ors, of course, included the Navy
l~a:-;1• Cafeteria and est.ablishme·nts in Clearfield and
La~·ton .

.\.nyone was fre<' to use thP cafeteria facilities as,
for Pxample, visitors and vendors (R. :~~). Employe-es
of ~pPtTy were similarly free to use the cafeteria faeilitit•s, which .approximately one-third of them did (R.
:;o). or, if t lwy chose, go to the Navy Basr Cafeteria or
into Layton or Clearfield, or bring their own lunch, which
the remaining two-thirds of them did (R. 28). The plant
l'al'l'tt-ria wa~ in pn·r~· material respect, including facilitit>:-:, ~Prvict'~ and prices, c01npar.able to and competitive
with the Xavy Base Cafderia and similar establishments
in Clearfield and Layton. Insofar as Sperry was conl't'rned, it made no difference whatsoever whether the
employer·:-: ate at the plant or went ~l:se\Yhere. In fact,
a~ rgard~ en•n ~pt>ny employees, the plant cafeteria
ditl't'rPd from the :Xav~· Ba~e Cafeteria and Pating establishment:-: in Clearfield and Layton only in the respect
that it wa~ located within the Sperry plant and was,
tht•n•fnn', l·lo~er to their place of employment. But this
proximity wa~ insufficient to cause even a majority of
the employee~ to patronize it.
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On the basis of the foregoing evidence the Commission was amply justified in finding that Sperry did not
eJrercise control over employee·s while on their lunch
period. Certainly it exercised no more control during
the lunch period over its employees who used the plant
cafeteria than it exercised over the majority of its employees who ate elsewhere.
Upon passing from the plant area into the plant
cafeteria Sperry's employees passed from an area supervi·sed and controlled by Sperry and into an area where
supervision and control was exercised by Clark, Inc., an
entirely different and independent business entity. In so
doing they passed from the "sp:atiallimits" of their employment with Sperry just as much as if they had left
the plant and gone to the Navy Cafeteria or into Layton
or Clearfield. And, if she had sustained her injuries at
those establishments it is clear that she would not be
entitled to compensation for her injuries.
·Thus, this case should be governed by the same rule
which was applied in Hold itch v. Sta11-dard Accident Ins.
Co. (5th Cir. 1953), 208 F. 2d 721, wherein the plaintiff
sustained injuries during her lunch period when she
tripped and fell as she was leaving a store "immediately
next door" to the plant of her •employer, where she had
gone to buy some gum for herself and her fellow employees. N·otwithstanding a showing by plaintiff that the
gum was purchased by employees to relax them and keep
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
them from getting thirsty and to keep them from eating
peeans and fruit that went into the employer's cakers, the
('tHtrt there affirmed a determination by the Commission
that the accident "did not arise out of and was not sustained in the roursP of her employment."
XPnrly all of the numerous authorities cited in .appellant'~ brief, to support her claim that it was error
for the Commission to deny her claim, including the
recent ease of Wilson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Utah
1963). :~S-l P. 2d 400, deal expressly with a situation in
which the injuries were sustained upon premises controlled and sup('rvised by the employer and used by him
as an integral part of his business. An appeal by the
employer ratlwr than the employee, moreover, is involved
in Thomas r. Proctor & Gamble. Mfg. Co. (Kan. 1919),

179 Pae. 37~; Employer's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Comm.
(Colo. 192-l), 230 Pac. 394; Twin Pe.aks Canning Co. v.
bul. Cnmm. (Ftah 1921), 196 Pac. 853; Goodyear Acft.
Corp.

1'.

Ind. Cnmm. (Ariz. 1945), 158 P. 2d 511; Hum-

plir".'' r. Ind. Comm. (Ill. 1918), 120 N.E. 816; Zarba v.

Lane (Mass. 19-17), 76 N.E. 2d 318; Texas Em,ployer.s'
,,,~. Assoc. r. Davidson ( Tex. 1956), 295 S.E. 2d 482;
American J/otors Corp. v. Ind. Comrn. (Wise. 1957), 83
X.\Y. ~dil-l; Dyer ~·.Sears. Roebuck & Co. (Mich. 1957),
~3 X.\Y. 2d 152: and Caporale v. Department of Taxation
and Fina.,~ee (X.Y. 1957), 142 N.E. 2d 213. In National
S11rt'/y Corp. r. BeUah (5th Cir. 1957), 245 F. 2d 936,
1
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as in the Wilson case supra in Utah, the employee appealed from a finding in the lower court that his injury
came within the Workmen's Compensation Act which
finding was affirmed on appe.al.
Not a single case or other authority cited by appellant supports the proposition upon which she must
pr·evail, if at all, that the Comn1ission had to find in her
favor as the only reasonable conclu.sion it could have

arrived .at under the evidence. Appellant's cases and authorities simply stand for the proposition that findings
have be~en made and sustained which permitted a recovery of compens.a tion on evidence which was similar
to, though distinguishable from, that in the present case.
In determining whether the premises upon which
an employee sustains injuries are the "employer's
premises" or in the "zone of employment" or within the
spatial limits of the employment for purposes 'Of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, the test is stated thus ir..
99 C.J.S. 825 (\Yorkmen's OOinpensation, Section 234
(h)):
" ... the word 'premises' should be given a reasonable interpretation, but it has .also been held
to be used in a limited sense. The word has been
held to mean the part of the property of the
e1nployer where the employee is ·to do his work,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in•rrpss
and egress, and, ordinarily should be •apn
plif'd to that portion of an employer's premises
upon which the plant equipment is located.

•

•

•

•

"A 'zone of employment' in this connection
has lwen defined .as the place of employment and
thP area therefrom, 'ttnder the control of the employer, or the premises owned or controlled by
the employPr or adjacent premises so near thereto
as to be considPred a part of the employer's premi~rs u•hen he exercises some direction or control
thereof." (Emphasis supplied.)
As is stated in 1 Larsen's 'Vorkmen's Compensation
Law, ~t'dion 21.21 pp. 298-99 in discussing situations
in which the course of employment goes beyond the fixed
hour:-; of work, including "unpaid lunch hours on the
pr('misl}:o;."
"In e.ach instance the time, although strictly
outside fiX'ed working hours, is closely contiguous
to them ... and, above all, the employee is within
the spatial limits of his employment." (Emphasis
added.)
It will be noted that appellant places heavy reliance
upon Lar,sen's, supra, to support her position and,

further, that the above language is included in the quotation from Larsen's at page 13 of appellant's brief.
~imilar references, express or by implication, to the
"employer's premises'' will be noted in nearly all of the
authoriti('s citM in appellant's brief.
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Analagous to the facts here pres·ented are the rases
in which it has been held that even injuries which are
sustained by employees on a parking lot which is owned,
maintained and controlled by the employer are not necessarily compensable unless the parking lot is so loc.atPcl
and used as to make it an integral part of the employl'r's
business operations. See, e.g. Johnson Bros. LmnlJPr Co.
v. Hood (Ky.), 330 S.\V. 2d 929; Vardzel v. Dravo Corp.
(Pa. 1960), 165 A. 2d 622; Evans v. Jones-Wils·on Inc.
(S.C.), 110 S.E. 2d 851; Sheridan v. Glen Alden Coal Co.
(Pa.), 50 A. 2d 540; Be'nnett v. l'anderbilt Univ. (Tenn.
1955), 277 S.W. 2d 386; Purington v. Dept. of Labor and
Industries (Wash.), 170 P. 2d 656; Finley r. St. Louis
Smelting and Refining Co. (Mo. 1950), 233 S.VV. 2d 725;
Levengood v. N. Y. Shipbuilding Corp. (N. J. 1946), 48
A. 2d 570; Storment v. Licari-Packard Grosse Pointe
(Mich.), 50 N.W. 2d 762.
The principle applied in these cases has equal persuasive force under the present facts. Thus, in the
Finley case the employee's shift was "from 7:30a.m. to
3 :30 p.m., and as usual he came up from \York underground at 3 :1 :J p.n1.," washed and changed his clothes
and at 3:25 p.1n. got to his car on the company's parking
lot which was "located on the company's property," which
lot the cmnpany maintained for "the 1nutual benefit of
it and its emplyees." He was injured "Then he raised
the car hood and the engine fan caught his hand. The
court there held that there wa~ "no casual connection
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
hPtween the injury and the employment" and an award
of compPn~at ion wa:-; reversed.

In the Uennett case the employee sustained injuries
as slw walked :.wro:-;:-; the parking lot of her employer
toward lwr automobile at the end of the day. The lot was
owned, maintained and controlled by the employer. The
court then• noted at page 388 of its opinion:
" ... there is a distinction between the 'premises'
and the 'prop<>rty' of the employer, as used in
eompensation cases. While all property O\'vned
by an employer may be likewise called 'premises'
in general u:-;agC', but it is obvious from our
('a~<'~. that 'premises' under our compensation
statute' means the part of the property where· the
employee is to do his work, including that part
which he is required to use for ingress and
Pgrps:-;."
~\

dPnial of compensation to the employee was affirmed.
The

v· ard2el case involved an appeal from an award

again~t the employer in a personal injury action wherein

the employee's injuries were sustained whi.le walking
aero~~ the employer's parking lot at the conclusion of
hi:' ~hift. The court stated at page 623:
..... it is obvious that the parking lot was not
a part of the operating business; it was distinct
therefrom and separated from defendant's plant
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by a public thoroughfare. * * '* The word 'premises' cannot be enlarged in its meaning and application so as to include land or property outside
of that used in connection \Yith the actual premises
where the ernployer carries on the business in
which the employee is engaged. * * * The use of
this facility was optional with each employee.''
(Emphasis added.)
From these cases it is obvious that had the control
and management of the parking lot been transferred
to an independent third party at the time of the injury,
as was the plant cafeteria in the present case, it would
not have been error to have denied compensation therefor.
Nor is the Wilson case, upon which appellant places
such heavy reliance, contrary to the rule of the authorities cited above. That case, as noted supra, involved
an .appeal by the employee from a determination by
the lower court that the Workmen's Compensation Act
was the exclusive remedy. The employee was there injured "while attempting to take advantage of ... (the
privilege of purchasing n1erchandise at a discount and
taking delivery thereof) during the noon hour and while
on the employer's premises." (Emphasis added.) This
Court there noted that "most of the cas-es hold that the
servant has the protection of the compensation acts
while attempting to take advantage of sueh privileges."
There was no question in that case but that the lot was
own·ed, maintained and controlled by he employer and
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that it was an integral part of it~ business activities,
~inre it was provided prin1arily for its business eusto1111'1':-i. ~lorpover, in the 1Vilson case the injuries were
<'Ull~t>d when a pile of tltP cmploye1's tires fell on her,
apparently hP<'a n~P they had been improperly stacked
hy ttw t'nlJJloyl'r's t'IIIJJloyces. This rase cannot stand for
thP propostion that it was error to deny compensation
in thP prp:-;pn t <'ase, which is dissimilar factually and
pnwedurally from the Wilson case.
In addition to the que~tion, discussed above, whether
the premise8 upon which the employee is injured are
clo:-;ply enough related to the emplo'Yment to cOinpel an
award of <'ontprn~ation to the employee, which as pointed
out ahon' i~ not so under the present facts, a further,
relatt'd, question i~ presented by the present appeal as
tn whether there is a causal relationship between the
injuries and the en1ployment. Certainly the Commission
wa~ ju~tified in finding as it did from the evidence that
no surh eausal relation existed in the present case.
Thi~

same question was before the court in Coston
r. Carne.oic-Illinois Steel Corp. (Ohio 1952), 125 N.E. 2d
;:~6, which "·as factually and procedurally similar to the
present ea~e. There, an en1ployee, who had no specific
time off for lunch, swallowed a piece of glass concealed
in a piece of pie which he had purchased in a restaurant
on the employer's premises, operated by an independent
enntraetor. It was held that his resulting injuries were
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not compensable because they were not proximatelr
caused by the employment. The court noted at page 737:
" ... an injury occurs in the course of and arises
out of the employment within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act if such injury followed as a natural incident of the work and as a
result of exposure occasioned by the nature, conditions and surroundings of the employment.

*

*

*

*

"It arises 'out of' the employment, when it is
apparent to the rational mind upon consideration
of all the circumstances, a causal connection exists
between the conditions under which the work is
required to be performed and the resulting injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen
to have followed as a natural incident of the work
and to have been contemplated by a reasonable
person familiar with the whole situation as a
result of the exposure occasioned by the nature
of the employment, then it arises 'out of' the employment. But it excludes an injury which cannot
fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from
a hazard to which the workmen would have been
equally exposed apart from the employment. The
causative danger must be peculiar to the work
and not common to the neighborhood. It must be
incidental to the character of the business and not
independent of the relation of n1aster and servant.
It need not have been foreseen or expected, but
after the event it must appear to have had its
origin in a risk connected with the employment,
and to have flowed from that source as a rational
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ronseqUPIH'P." (Quoting from In re Employers
J,iabilif,lt A . . . . . l/rauce (•n''l'· (~fass.), 10~ N.E. 2d
·q-)

,,,

j

•

Tlw eourt eoncluded at 7:17 that, measured by the
rule of the quoted languagP,

.. \re

do not believe that the facts in the insati:::;fy this rule nor conform to its
Pssential require.ments. Plaintiff's employment
rannot be ~aid to be a contributing cause of his
injury. His injury cannot be said to have followed as a natural incident to the work and to
han' been contemplated by a reasonable person
familiar with the whole situation.
*
*
*
*
~tant ea~e

"Plaintiff's injury was not received in the
t·oursp 'Of or arising out of his employment .
and aeeonlingly the judgment of the eourt of
conunon pleas is affirmed."
Thi~

Court stated in Ctah Oopper Co. v. Jn,d. Comm.
(rtah Ul~O), 37 1~tah 118, 193 Pac. 2-!, that "Society is
interested in seeing that industries bear the expense of
ea ring for those injured while working in such industries." By the same token, industry must not be burdened
by t11e costs of injuries which are not c·ausally connected
to the employrnent.
Certainly, the applicant's injuries in the present case
are no more closely related to, and no more foreseeable
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as an incident of, her employment than were the plaintiff's injuries in the Coston case, supra. Nor can it be
contended that applicant's injuries resulted from a danger "peculiar to the work,'' or that she would not "have
been equally exposed apart from her employment," if
she had decided to buy and ·eat her dinner in a restaurant
located off her employer's premises, which she was free
t'O do. The cause of her injuries had no relation whatever
to the relation of master and servant between herself
and Sperry Rand Corporation.
CONCLUSION
The test of control by the employer over the premises
whe.re the injury occurs, which has been repeatedly and
consistently applied by the courts over the years as noted
above, has proved to be a logical and workable standard
by which to govern the granting or denial of compensation in this type of case. This was the standard by which
the Commission determined that applica:nt's injuries occurred on premises which were not controlled by her
emplo'Yer and, further, that the relationship between
her employment and the injur:r was too tenuous to justify
an award of compensation.
It must be kept in mind that it was never intended
that all injuries suffered by an employee should be taxed
to the etmployer, but only those which have a direct causal
connection with the services which the employee is hired
to perform.
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It is not suffi<'irnt at thi~ point for appellant to
that an award in her favor could have been made
in the prP~Pnt <·a~P. Rather, she must show than an
award in her favor ''"a~ the only reaso1wbl~ choice which
the Commission had in viP'W of the evidence. She has not
and eannot ma kP such a showing here and the denial of
her claim for compensation should be affirmed.

~how

Respectfully submitted,
~KEE~.

\YORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN

JOHN H. SNOW
Attorneys for Respondent
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